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This paper explores the use of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic by decision makers in 
a financial market; in particular, the degree to which horserace bettors anchor their probability 
judgments on the advantage afforded by a horse‟s barrier-position. The results suggest that 
under certain conditions bettors anchor on barrier-position information revealed at previous 
race meetings, but not on the most recent race outcomes. In fact, bettors appear to use the 
most recent race outcomes appropriately when forming probability estimates; but only when 
the results are in line with their mental model of barrier-position advantage. Bettors with 
varying levels of expertise are shown to be subject to anchoring, although greater expertise is 
generally associated with less anchoring. The paper concludes that the manner and degree of 
anchoring in real world environments is complex.  




    It has been demonstrated in numerous studies that individuals use simple rules of thumb or 
heuristics to make decisions within their limited knowledge and computational capacities. 
However,  these  heuristics  can  result  in  systematic  biases  (e.g.,  Cohen,  1993;  Kahneman, 
Slovic,  &  Tversky,  1982;  Kahneman  &  Tversky,  1972;  Tversky  &  Kahneman,  1974). 
Individuals who use one of the most common heuristics (anchoring and adjustment) to make 
estimates, start from an initial value (the anchor) and adjust this upwards or downwards to 
account  for  the  information  they  have  available.  Previous  research  suggests  that  these 
adjustments are often crude and inadequate (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). However, most 
studies have been undertaken in laboratories. The purpose of this  empirical enquiry is to 
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contribute to the understanding of these anchoring effects in naturalistic environments. In 
particular, to what extent these effects are a feature of decisions made in financial markets; 
specifically, the horserace betting market. Consequently, this study provides a rare analysis of 
anchoring  effects  in  a  naturalistic  environment.  Previous  real  world  studies  of  anchoring 
effects often analyze the decisions of individuals made under artificial conditions, where they 
are aware that they are being monitored (which may result in modified behavior). On the 
contrary, this study explores anchoring where individuals make decisions in their own domain 
when they do not know that they are being investigated. 
    Betting markets aggregate individual decisions, and will, to some extent, reflect the biases 
displayed  by  individual  bettors.  However,  Wallsten  et  al.,  (1997)  note  that  markets  also 
involve interactions between different participants in an environment which offers incentives 
for individuals to effectively use information (Waller et al., 1999). As a result, one might 
expect less pronounced anchoring effects in markets.  
The  paper is  organized  as  follows:  A  brief  review  of  the  anchoring effect  literature  is 
provided in section II. In section III, relevant features of the horserace betting market are 
described;  in  particular,  those  which  make  it  an  ideal  real  world  environment  to  explore 
anchoring effects. In addition, the hypotheses to be tested are outlined. The data and the 
models which are employed to examine the extent to which bettors anchor their judgments are 
described  in  section  IV.  The  results  are  presented  and  discussed  in  section  V  and  some 




     It has been found that, faced with uncertainty, individuals tend to use external suggestions 
or  self-generated  values  (e.g.,  Cervone  &  Peake,  1986;  Chapman  &  Johnson,  1994)  as 
anchors. Adjustments are then made from the anchor value to the target value, but these 
adjustments are often insufficient (e.g., Quattrone et al., 1984; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
      Two  forms  of  anchoring  have  been  investigated  in  previous  studies:  „traditional‟  and 
„basic‟ anchoring. Traditional anchoring effects appear when a two stage process is involved: 
subjects are asked to compare an anchor value (perhaps a randomly drawn number) with the 
value to be estimated (e.g. the length of the river Nile). Subsequently, subjects are asked to 
give their own estimates of this value (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974). Basic anchoring occurs 
when subjects anchor on some piece of information, even when they are not asked to compare 
this information with the value to be estimated (e.g. Mussweiler and Englich, 2005). It has  
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been  shown  that  basic  anchoring  effects  occur  unintentionally  and  unconsciously  when 
sufficient attention is paid to the anchor value, even if the anchor is completely irrelevant to 
the value to be estimated (e.g. Wilson et al., 1996). 
    Most previous studies have focussed on traditional anchoring, and these, in general, have 
found that anchoring is a widespread phenomenon affecting a broad range of judgments (e.g., 
Cervone & Peake, 1986; Chapman & Johnson, 2002; Epley & Gilovich, 2001; Hinsz et al., 
1997;  Joyce  &  Biddle,  1981;  Northcraft  &  Neale,  1987;  Wright  &  Anderson,  1989).  In 
addition,  a  number  of  factors,  such  as,  anchors  from  different  sources  (self-generated  or 
externally provided) (e.g., Davies, 1997), the degree of relevance of the anchors to the targets 
(e.g., Chapman & Johnson, 2002; Ritov, 1996; Shelton, 1999), the representation of anchors 
(e.g., Mussweiler & Englich, 2005; Mussweiler & Strack, 2001; Wong & Kwong, 2000), 
positive affect (e.g., Estrada et al., 1997), the absolute value of anchors and the level of 
knowledge and experience of decision makers (e.g., Caverni & Pris, 1990; Joyce & Biddle, 
1981; Northcraft & Neale, 1987) have been shown to lead to different anchoring effects. The 
durability  of  anchoring  effects  has  been  shown  to  be  greater  with  self-generated  (c.f. 
externally  provided)  anchors  and  to  increase  with  the  frequency  with  which  relevant 
information is involved. In fact, under certain conditions some individuals‟ judgments have 
been shown to be influenced by anchors one week after they first became aware of them 
(Mussweiler, 2001).  
        The majority of the anchoring effect literature has arisen from studies conducted under 
controlled experimental conditions. Laboratory settings offer a number of advantages over 
field-based environments, including their ability to investigate the effect of discrete factors 
under a set of manufactured conditions using controlled groups of participants. However, 
“such controlled settings, whilst allowing unequivocal identification of relationships between 
variables, often omit vital elements which are present in real-world decision environments” 
(Bruce & Johnson, 1997, p.287). The complex, dynamic, and high-stakes settings experienced 
by decision-makers in real world contexts are often difficult to replicate in the laboratory 
(Yates,  1992).  As  a  result,  different  decision-making  behaviors  have  been  observed  in 
experimental and naturalistic studies (Anderson & Brown, 1984). In order to understand a 
phenomenon,  it  is  important  to  examine  results  from  both  laboratory  and  field  settings. 
Consequently, the current study investigates to what extent anchoring effects, often observed 
in laboratory settings, are a feature of a real world setting, the horserace betting market.  
 




    Horserace betting markets are valuable settings for developing insights regarding anchoring 
effects  because  they  (i)  incorporate  the  characteristics  of  many  dynamic  and  naturalistic 
decision-making environments, where the use of information is a key ingredient to success; 
and (ii) involve a number of features which enable anchoring to be explored more easily than 
in other real world decision-making settings. These issues are now discussed. 
 
Horserace betting markets as dynamic naturalistic decision settings 
    Horserace betting markets, like many other real world settings, are dynamic environments 
in which participants make probability estimates and risky choices in the face of an evolving 
information set. In common with wider financial markets, they involve a large number of 
participants,  and  a  variety  of  information  is  available  to  inform  choices,  including 
considerable advice from professionals. Outcomes of bettors‟ decisions matter to them and 
the  risks  and  pressures  inherent  in  these  markets  are  not  easy  to  replicate  in  laboratory 
experiments  (Orasanu  &  Connolly,  1993).  In  addition,  betting  markets  contain  action-
feedback  loops  and  decisions  are  made  in  a  limited  time  period;  bettors  being  able  to 
assimilate  information  concerning  race  outcomes  into  their  decision  models  in  order  to 
improve subsequent decision accuracy (Goodman, 1998; Johnson & Bruce, 2001). Moreover, 
the procedure for selecting the horse on which to wager varies for different individuals. These 
are very similar to the conditions faced in many other real world environments (Orasanu & 
Connolly, 1993).  
    As a result of the factors discussed above, it is argued that betting markets can shed light on 
behaviors in other real world contexts. More specifically, data from betting markets has been 
extensively employed to shed light on investors‟ behavior (e.g., Asch & Quandt, 1987; Dowie, 
1976; Johnson, et al., 2006; Hausch & Ziemba, 1985; Levitt, 2004; Schnytzer & Shilony, 
1995; Sung & Johnson, 2007) and Law and Peel (2002) argue that betting markets offer a 
valuable arena in which to explore the manner in which information is used by investors in 
wider financial markets. One of the key reasons for this is that horserace betting markets share 
a number of fundamental characteristics with wider financial markets, including, extensive 
market knowledge, ease of entry, large numbers of participants (who can be classified as 
noise traders and informed traders) and the factors which influence a horse‟s prospects (an 
asset‟s value) are complex and interdependent (Snyder, 1978). Horserace betting markets are 
in fact directly equivalent to options and futures markets since each “n-horse race corresponds 
to a market for contingent claims  with n states in which the ith state corresponds to the  
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outcome in which the ith horse wins the race” (Shin, 1993, p.1142). In state contingent claims 
terms, the purchase price of a claim on horse i in race j which pays $1 if horse i wins and 
nothing if it loses, is given by 1/(1+Oij), where Oij represents horse i‟s quoted market odds. 
The purchase prices of claims are clearly associated with the subjective probability judgments 
of the betting public, since these judgments lead to betting decisions which directly influence 
the odds. In the same way, investors‟ expectations concerning an asset‟s future value will 
affect their investment decisions, which in turn will affect the price of the option/future etc.  
    Investment in any financial asset involves transactions costs, and, at least in the short run, 
offers  a  negative  expected  return.  This  is  particularly  the  case  in  state  contingent  claims 
markets  and  it  is  not  uncommon  for  those  who  write  about  these  markets  to  refer  to 
investments  as  „bets‟.  For  example,  Saber (1999,  p.30)  devotes  a  section  of  his  book  on 
financial markets to “valuing an option as a „bet‟ ”. There is, therefore, no reason to believe 
that bettors at the racetrack should behave differently to investors in such markets. 
    The Hong Kong horserace betting market, which provides the data for this study, is strictly 
organized and regulated, with enforcement to prevent illegal activity, including insider trading. 
These are similar to the conditions under which most financial markets operate and this lends 
weight to the view that behavior in these markets may offer an insight into investors‟ behavior 
in other financial markets. However, whilst the Hong Kong market is regulated, there is no 
monitoring of individuals‟ bets and the dynamic environment faced by bettors is far removed 
from the controlled environments experienced in the laboratory.  
    Anecdotal evidence might suggest that moral hazard is an issue which affects horseracing 
results (e.g. race fixing by various methods)  and therefore may have a bearing on decisions 
made in these settings. However, the tight regulation of the Hong Kong horserace betting 
market  and  the  failure  of  any  studies  to  prove  systematic  activity  of  this  sort  in  any 
horseracing  market  negate  this  concern  (e.g.  Schnytzer  &  Shilony,  2007).  In  addition, 
openness with regard to information concerning previous results is also a feature of the Hong 
Kong market. Consequently, bettors, like investors in financial markets, are able to access 
relevant data when making their betting decisions 
 
Advantages of Horserace Betting Markets over other Real World Settings 
    Horserace betting markets offer a number of advantages over other real world decision 
settings for exploring anchoring effects: First, a large quantity of relevant decision data is 
available. For example, there are over 650 races per annum in Hong Kong and decision-
relevant and race outcome information is accessible. Second, horserace betting markets are  
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relatively simple financial markets, providing a clear view of pricing issues (odds and their 
movements)  which  are  complicated  in  other  markets  (Sauer,  1998),  and  this  is  clearly 
demonstrated in  Bruce and  Johnson (2005). Third, unlike some naturalistic settings, each 
betting decision is made under similar conditions, and the result of the combined decisions of 
participants is recorded, in the form of market odds. 
    A few studies have explored anchoring effects in real world decision environments, such as, 
auditing, real estate, and negotiation (e.g., Ashton & Ashton, 1988; Northcraft & Neale, 1987; 
Ritov, 1996), but these studies have generally employed questionnaires or specific (artificial) 
projects. In addition, participants often knew that they were taking part in an experiment and 
may  have  modified  their  reactions.  Consequently,  there  is  a  need  for  an  exploration  of 
anchoring effects where individuals make decisions in their own domain without knowing 
that they are being investigated. Betting markets provide such conditions. 
 
Barrier-position as a Potential Anchoring Factor: Hypotheses  
    In Hong Kong, horses begin their races from “starting stalls”. These devices ensure that all 
horses  are released  simultaneously. Each  horse is  randomly  allocated a  stalls or “barrier-
position” (BP) from 1 (the inside rail) up to 14 (the outside rail) and these are announced the 
day before the race. The BP determines where in relation to the inside of the racetrack the 
horse starts and where it is often forced, due to the position of other runners, to run much of 
the race. Due to track configuration (e.g., short oval racetracks with sharp bends) or other 
racetrack  topography  (e.g.,  faster  ground  on  the  inside  of  the  track)  certain  BPs  may  be 
advantageous. Most racing publications advocate careful consideration of BP when assessing 
the chances of each horse. For example, Cotton (1990), advises “…make no mistake (BP) can 
be the most important component in the outcome of many flat races” (p. 113). Similarly, 
Beyer (1983, p.42) observes, “while some [post position] biases are due to the idiosyncrasies 
in the racing surface, many tracks have shapes that influence the results. At tracks less than a 
mile in circumference, the sharp turns and short straight almost always work to the advantage 
of the front runner and the horses on the inside.” Some influential racing writers devote whole 
chapters of their books to exploring the impact of post position on results (e.g. Mordin, 1992) 
and some devote whole books to the subject (e.g. Wheldon et al., 2002) 
    Both racetracks in Hong Kong, Happy Valley (HV) and Sha Tin (ST), are oval circuits and 
the track configuration suggests that those horses with BPs on the inside of the track (low BPs) 
will be favored, since they will be required to run less distance. HV has a circumference of 
only 1454 meters, whereas the circumference of ST is 1933 meters. The bends at HV are  
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therefore tighter than those at ST; the tightest bend at HV having a radius of only 91 meters, 
whereas  the  equivalent  bend  at  ST  has  a  radius  of  158  meters.  Consequently,  the 
configuration of both these tracks suggests that horses with a low BP will be favored (more so 
at HV). In addition, the results of previous races point to the advantage of low BPs; and this 
attracts media attention. In considering the degree to which bettors may focus on BP, the R
2 
of the BP variable in Table 1 (i.e. 0.0145 for HV) should not be considered in isolation.  Odds 
have  been  shown  to  be  a  reasonable  guide  to  horses‟  chances  of  success  (i.e.  odds 
successfully incorporate information from a variety of sources: e.g. Johnson & Bruce, 2001). 
Despite this, there are many factors which influence results that odds do not account for. For 
example,  it  is  clear  from  the  R
2  value  in  Table  2  that  at  HV  a  model  which  simply 
incorporates odds and BP, accounts for only 12.61% of the variation in results.  However, BP 
alone accounts for 1.45% of the variation in results at HV (see Table 1). Consequently, at HV, 
BP alone accounts for 0.0145/0.1261 (11.5%) of the variation in results predicted by odds. 
This is a significant proportion for one variable and it is likely to figure prominently in a 
bettors‟ assessment of a horse‟s prospects. 
    It has been shown that that basic anchoring effects occur unintentionally and unconsciously 
when  sufficient  attention  is  paid  to  the  anchor  value,  even  if  the  anchor  is  completely 
irrelevant to the value to be estimated (e.g. Wilson et al., 1996). Consequently, given the 
strong evidence for anchoring observed in the laboratory, we would expect bettors, who are 
subject to the media and numerous racing publications advocating the importance of BP and 
who are faced by the classic low post position favoring configuration of ST and, particularly, 
HV,  to  focus  on  this  factor  when  assessing  a  horse‟s  chances,  to  the  neglect  of  other 
information. We therefore believe that they will be subject to a form of basic anchoring on 
this factor.  This view is encapsulated in the first hypothesis: 
(1) Bettors in the Hong Kong horserace betting market anchor their judgments of horses‟ 
winning probabilities on low BP advantage. 
    Race meetings in Hong Kong are generally run twice a week, often alternating between 
locations; weekends at ST and mid-week (evenings) at HV. Both tracks are within eight miles 
of each other, and are readily accessible by public transport. Consequently, many bettors 
attend both meetings. Bettors at the racetrack often have little time between races to fully 
assimilate the results which occur that given day (races are typically run every 35 minutes) 
but they will often spend considerable time reviewing the results during the subsequent days. 
As discussed above, we expect BP to be one of the key factors which bettors consider when 
assessing a horse‟s prospects and it is likely, therefore, that they will review the BP advantage  
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displayed  in  the  results  at  the  previous  race  meeting.  This  activity  is  facilitated  by  local 
newspapers  and  specialist  racing  publications  which  print  the  results  of  previous  race 
meetings,  including  the  winning  BPs.  Media  comment  concerning  the  BP  advantage 
displayed at the racetracks during certain meetings is also common. Since many bettors will 
attend both HV and ST in the same week it is likely that the results from the race meeting 
held earlier that week will be at the forefront of their minds, and this may unduly influence 
their subjective probability judgments.  Consequently, we test a second hypothesis: 
(2) Bettors at a given race meeting anchor on the results of the previous race meeting.  
Previous research suggests that individuals tend to anchor on information which is the most 
immediate/vivid. For example, Whyte & Sebenius (1997) demonstrated that negotiators were 
more likely to anchor on useless/irrelevant information which was encountered immediately 
prior to making their judgments than on information which was relevant but encountered 
earlier.  They  suggested  that  “the  order  in  which  potential  anchors  are  encountered  may 
determine what anchor or anchors are used” while “the relevance to the estimation task to be 
performed may not be the dominant criterion in anchor selection” (p. 82). At a race meeting 
the most immediate information concerns the result of the previous race. We therefore test the 
following hypothesis: 
(3) Bettors anchor their probability judgments on the BP of the winning horse in the previous 
race. 
    Finally, experimental studies suggest that decision makers with greater expertise are less 
prone to anchoring effects (e.g., Bonner, 1990; Mussweiler & Strack, 2000; Northcraft & 
Neale, 1987). To explore whether this phenomenon applies in naturalistic environments we 
test the following hypothesis: 
(4) The probability judgments of bettors with greater expertise are less prone to anchoring 




    The data, drawn from the pari-mutuel horserace betting markets operating at HV and ST 
racetracks in Hong Kong (where the odds reflect the decisions of bettors), include the win 
odds, BP, and finishing position for all horses running in races between September, 3, 2000 
and October, 18, 2006; 1,428 races in 183 meetings at HV (16,971 horses) and 2,817 races in 
295 meetings at ST (37,364 horses). Both these racetracks stage „flat‟ horse races (no races 
over jumps) on both grass and artificial („dirt‟) surfaces. The races are a mixture of handicap  
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(where each horse is allocated a weight to carry based on its ability, in order to try to make the 
race competitive) and stakes races (where weights are not allocated on the basis of ability) run 
over distances of between 1000 and 2400 metres, where the mean winning times are 57.58 
and 150.57 seconds, respectively. The number of horses in each race at these tracks varies 
from 7 to 14 with modes of 12 and 14 at HV and ST, respectively. Odds prevailing in the 
market at three different times were collected: (a) the final odds, observed when the betting 
market closes as the race starts; (b) the odds 5 minutes before the start of the race (“late 
odds”); and (c) odds observed at midnight prior to the days‟ racing (“early odds”), formed as 
a result of bets placed on the day before the race. Odds at these different times are collected in 
order to compare the degree of anchoring displayed by bettors with more and less betting 
expertise; these distinctions are discussed below.  
 
Models and Variables 
    In a pari-mutuel betting market, the odds on horse i in race j (Oij ) are determined by the 
proportion of money bet on this horse, as follows: 

















,                                                     (1) 
where  ij W  is the amount of money bet on horse i in race j,  nj represents the number of horses 
in race j and d is the deduction by the pari-mutuel operator from the total money bet made. It 
is expected that the odds will change as the market develops according to equation (1) until 
the odds finally reflect the market‟s best estimate of a horse i‟s chance of winning race j 
(Asch  et  al.,  1984;  Figlewski,  1979;  Johnson  &  Bruce,  2001).  Consequently,  bettors‟ 












ij p  represents bettors‟ subjective probability judgment of horse i 
winning race j. Based on the published Oij we are able to estimate the 
s
ij p  using Eq.1, since the 
deduction d and the rules concerning rounding are known
1. 
 
Conditional logit model. 
    We employ conditional logit (hereafter CL) models to detect the extent to which bettors‟ 
subjective judgments of horse i‟s chance of winning race j,
s
ij p , deviate from horse i‟s true 
probability of success. These deviations are used to assess the degree to which bettors anchor 
their judgments on BP information.   
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    CL models are popular means of exploring the factors which influence horserace results 
(e.g., Figlewski, 1979; Schnytzer & Shilony, 1995; Johnson & Bruce, 2001). They are used to 
estimate the chance of horse i winning race j (i.e. its objective winning probability, 
o
ij p ) based 
on the information available concerning horse i and all other runners in race j. These are 
models in which the winning probabilities are derived such that the winning probabilities of 
all horses in a given race sum to one. In a linear regression, for example, there is nothing to 
guarantee that this would happen and, indeed, it almost never does. Consequently, CL models 
account for the competitive element of a horserace (see McFadden, 1974). 
     We estimate two CL models. The first estimates the probability of horse i winning race j 
based solely on information concerning BP, as follows: 




ij BP a BP a p
1 1 1 ) exp( ) exp(     for i = 1,2,… nj,                            (2)                                                                                                       
where  ij BP is the BP of horse i in race j, nj is the number of runners in race j and  1 a  indicates 
the contribution which BP makes to the horse‟s chance of winning race j. The second model 
estimates the probability of horse i winning race j based on information concerning BP and 
the bettors‟ subjective probability estimate of horse i winning race j (
s
ij p ), as follows: 








ij p b BP a p b BP a p
1 1 2 1 2 ) ln ( ) ln exp(      for i=1,2,…nj.             (3)                                 
The coefficients α1, a2 and b1 are measured by maximizing the joint probability of observing 
the  winners  of  all  the  races  in  the  sample.  The  degree  to  which  BP  affects  winning 
probabilities and the extent to which bettors anchor on BP information can be discerned from 
the significance and signs of these coefficients. In particular, if a1 is significant this suggests 
that BP has an impact on a horse‟s winning probability. If, in addition, a2 is insignificant this 
implies  that  bettors  fully  account  for  the  impact  of  BP  in  their  subjective  probability 
judgments. If both a1 and a2 have the same sign and are significant this implies that bettors‟ 
judgments do not sufficiently account for BP advantage. Equally, if a2 has the opposite sign to 
a1 and both are significant, this suggests that bettors anchor on BP information. If bettors‟ 




ij), then α2 
would equal 0 and b1 would equal one. 
     
Hypothesis Testing 
    Hypothesis one, that bettors in the HK horserace betting market anchor their judgments of 
horses‟ winning probabilities on low BP advantage, is tested by exploring whether horses 
with low BPs are over-bet in the Hong Kong market as a whole.   
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    In  testing  hypothesis  two,  that  bettors  at  a  given  meeting  anchor  on  the  results  at  the 
previous  meeting,  we  make  use  of  the  fact  that  HV  has  tighter  bends  and  a  smaller 
circumference (c.f. ST). Consequently, horses with a low BP at HV are likely to be at a 
greater advantage; the results detailed below confirm this. Consequently, we might expect 
bettors, who have recently observed a significant low BP advantage at HV to anchor on this 
and over-bet horses with a low BP at ST (where the BP advantage is less marked). Similarly, 
we might expect bettors, who have recently observed only moderate low BP advantage at ST 
to anchor on this fact, and to under-bet horses with low BP at HV (where low BP offers a 
significant advantage). Consequently, we test hypothesis two by exploring whether horses 
with low BPs are under-bet at HV and are over-bet at ST; if this is the case it will suggest that 
results from the previous meeting may be unduly influencing bettors‟ subjective probability 
judgments. 
    Whilst ST and HV race meetings generally alternate, it is not always the case, and this 
provides an opportunity to further test hypothesis two. In particular, we explore “different 
track  meetings”  separately  (i.e.  ST  preceded  by  HV,  and  vice-versa)  and  “same  track 
meetings” (e.g. ST [HV] preceded by ST [HV]). Hypothesis two would be supported if low 
BPs are under-bet at HV and are over-bet at ST at different track meetings but they are 
appropriately bet at same track meetings. 
    It has been demonstrated that individuals use outcome feedback in a dynamic environment 
to  reduce  their  decision  biases  (Johnson  et  al.,  2006).  Consequently,  if  anchoring  causes 
bettors at HV to over-rely on the results from ST (held earlier in the week) (and vice-versa), it 
is likely that this effect will be most pronounced in the first few races of the race meeting. 
Observation of the outcomes of early races should, via appropriate learning, enable bettors to 
adjust their probability judgments to more appropriately account for BP advantage in later 
races. To further test hypothesis two, we explore differences in the degree to which low BP 
horses are over-bet  at HV and  ST in the first three and  the  last three  races.  Support for 
hypothesis two would arise if low BP horses were under-bet in the first three races at HV. 
This is predicted by hypothesis two because a low BP should afford a considerably greater 
advantage at HV than at the previous ST meeting. In addition, less under-betting on low BP 
horses  should  occur  in  the  last  three  races  at  HV,  as  bettors  learn  from  the  earlier  race 
outcomes at HV and place less emphasis on the outcomes of races at the previous ST meeting. 
Similarly, hypothesis two would be supported if there was evidence of less over-betting on 
low BP horses at ST in the last three races (c.f. the first three).  
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    We also explore the degree to which low BP horses are under/over-bet at ST/HV in the first 
three and the last three races at (a) same and (b) different track meetings. Hypothesis two 
would be further supported if there was greater evidence of under/over-betting of low BP 
horses in the first three races at different track meetings at HV/ST than in same track meetings 
at HV/ST. 
    We test hypothesis three, that bettors anchor their probability judgments on the BP of the 
winning horse in the previous race, by exploring if bettors over-estimate the prospects of 
horses with a low/high BP immediately following a low/high BP victory. As discussed above, 
the configurations of both ST and HV suggest that low BP confers an advantage since horses 
running close to the inside rail travel less distance. However, other factors can affect the BP 
advantage. In particular, it is possible that the condition of the surface on certain sections of 
track  (perhaps  as  a  result  of  weather  conditions)  may  lead  to  certain  BPs  offering  an 
advantage at a particular time on any given day. The results of previous races run on the same 
day may, therefore, provide some guidance to the particular BP advantage operating; a low 
(1-4)/high (>7) BP victory suggesting an enhanced/reduced low BP advantage in the next race. 
However, since individuals often anchor on the most immediate information, it is possible 
that  bettors  place  too  much  emphasis  on  the  most  recent  race  result  when  forming  their 
subsequent probability judgments. Consequently, we explore whether a low/high BP victory 
in the previous race leads bettors to over-estimate the probability of horses with a similar BP 
winning the following race.  
    We test hypothesis four, that the probability judgments of bettors with greater expertise are 
less prone to anchoring associated with BP advantage than the judgments of bettors with less 
expertise, by making use of the fact that a bettor‟s level of expertise has been shown to be 
related to the time at which they bet. This enables a distinction to be made between bettors 
with three levels of expertise: The odds formed by bets placed on the day preceding the race 
(early odds) are taken to represent the bets of those with the least expertise, since these bettors 
have chosen to bet at a time when significant information concerning a horse‟s prospects is 
not available (e.g., the horse‟s condition as displayed in the parade ring prior to the race, late 
jockey  changes).  Those  who  possess  important  information  concerning  horses‟  winning 
prospects have an incentive to bet late in pari-mutuel markets since this minimizes the chance 
of others simply mirroring their bets and reducing the odds on their selected horse(s). Late 
bettors are confirmed as relatively knowledgeable bettors, who achieve higher returns than 
other bettors, by a number of studies (e.g., Asch et al., 1984; Dowie, 2003; Johnson & Bruce, 
1992). The odds observed five minutes before the race starts (late odds) are therefore regarded  
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as being influenced by individuals with moderate expertise. It is well known that professional 
bettors  operate  in  the  Hong  Kong  market  and  that  they  spend  considerable  resources  in 
analyzing results of previous races in order to make their selections. They tend to bet heavily 
in the last couple of minutes before the race (Benter, 1994). Since odds in a pari-mutuel 
market are determined by the relative amount of money bet on each horse (see Eq. 1), it could 
be argued that the final odds will also be influenced by the bets of those with less expertise 
who bet early. However, late bettors have the opportunity to bet in a manner to exploit any 
biases they observe in earlier betting patterns. Consequently, final odds are assumed to be 
those most influenced by bettors with the greatest expertise.  
    Clearly, the final odds not only incorporate the wagers of those with greatest expertise, but 
also those with moderate and least expertise. Similarly, the odds five minutes before the race 
incorporate the wagers of those with moderate expertise and of those with least expertise. The 
distinctions  between  the  betting  of  those  distinguished  by  their  level  of  expertise  may 
therefore be masked to some extent by comparing the odds at these different points in time. 
This problem would be overcome if we could compare early odds with those determined by 
the amount of money wagered on horses (a) from the commencement of betting on the day of 
the race up to 5 minutes before the start of the race and (b) from 5 minutes before the race 
until  the  race  starts.  This  would  enable  the  marginal  odds  created  by  the  three  groups 
distinguished by their levels of expertise to be more clearly defined. Unfortunately, this would 
require knowledge of the amount bet in the market in these different time periods, which we 
could not obtain. Consequently, in analyzing the results it should be bourn in mind that any 
distinctions we do observe in the early, late and final odds are likely to under-state the true 
distinctions between the betting behavior of these those with different levels of expertise. 
    Each of the models used to test hypotheses 1-3 are developed on the basis of (a) early, (b) 
late, and (c) final odds and these are used to assess differences in the degree and the nature of 
anchoring effects between bettors with different (increasing) levels of expertise. 
 
Results and Discussion 
 
Anchoring in the Hong Kong Horserace Betting Market as a Whole 
    The results of estimating CL models to examine to what extent a horse‟s BP affects its 
finishing position are given in Table 1. For the Hong Kong market as a whole, and for both 
HV  and  ST,  the  coefficient  of  BP  is  negative  and  significant  at  the  1%  and  5%  levels,  
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respectively, suggesting that a low BP improves a horse‟s winning chance and that the effect 
is greater at HV. 
Insert Tables 1 and 2 about here 
 
    The results of estimating CL models with the horse‟s BP and bettors‟ subjective probability 
judgments as independent variables are reported in Table 2. We focus, at this stage, on the 
results  associated  with  the  final  odds  in  the  market,  since  these  represent  the  combined 
probability judgments of all the market participants.  
    For the Hong Kong market as a whole the coefficient of the natural log of the bettors‟ 
subjective probability is significant at the 1% level, suggesting that bettors‟ judgments are 
generally in line with horses‟ actual winning probabilities. In addition, the BP coefficient is 
not significant at the 5% level, suggesting that the public appropriately account for BP in their 
subjective probability judgments. Taken alone, these results suggest that Hong Kong bettors 
do not anchor their judgments on the clear advantage afforded to those horses with low BP; 
this advantage being easily discerned from the configuration of the racetracks, from previous 
race results and from media comment. Consequently, one might conclude that anchoring on 
BP advantage is absent. This finding is clearly at odds with the main conclusions of the 
anchoring literature (e.g., Thomas & Handley, 2005; Northcraft & Neale, 1987). However, as 
demonstrated below, this inconsistency arises because the conclusions based on the Hong 
Kong market as a whole are misleading. 
    In fact, combining results from the two racetracks leads to model mis-specification since the 
effect of BP on winning probabilities and the manner in which bettors handle BP information 
at the two racetracks appears to be different. This is confirmed by comparing the sum of the 
information contained in the separate CL models for the two racetracks with the information 
contained in the CL model developed for the Hong Kong market as a whole. This is achieved 
by conducting a likelihood ratio (LR) test based on the maximum log-likelihood (LL) values 
for  models  simply  incorporating  BP  (given  by  Equation  2),  based  on  (a)  HV  data  (LHV: 
represents the LL of a BP model simply based on HV data) (b) ST data (LST: represents the 
LL of a BP model simply based on HV data) and (c) for the Hong Kong market as a whole 
(i.e. HV+ST: LHK: represents the LL of a BP model based on HV+ST data). The quantity K= 
2(LHK – [LHV + LST]) is distributed
2
n  , where n is the difference between the total number of 
parameters estimated  in the individual racetrack‟s  models  and  in the combined model. A 
similar LR test is conducted for models based on HV, ST and HV+ST data incorporating both 
BP and odds implied probabilities (given by Equation (3)).   
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    The results of the two LR tests for the models incorporating simply (i) BP and (ii) BP and 
odds  implied  probabilities  (where  K  takes  the  values  54.6  ( ] 01 [.
2
1   =  6.64)  and  9.2 
( ] 01 [.
2
2  =9.2), respectively), suggest that significantly more information concerning the effect 
of BP on winning probabilities and the manner in which bettors incorporate this information 
in their judgments can be derived from exploring models for the two racetracks separately 
(than by combining the data for the two tracks).  
In  fact,  the  coefficient  of  BP  in  the  HV  CL  model  incorporating  bettors‟  subjective 
probabilities is negative and significant at the 10% level, whereas it is positive and significant 
at the 1% level in the ST model (see Table 2). These results suggest that bettors at HV/ST 
under/over use BP advantage information. It is clear, therefore, that the results for the Hong 
Kong market as a whole mask the manner in which bettors at the two tracks use information. 
However, at both tracks the coefficient of the natural log of the odds implied probability is 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that bettors‟ subjective probability judgments are a 
reasonable guide to a horse‟s winning chance.  
     In  sum,  the  evidence  presented  above  appears,  in  relation  to  bettors  at  ST,  to  support 
hypothesis one, namely, that bettors anchor their probability judgments on BP advantage, 
whereas the evidence drawn from HV appears to reject the hypothesis. Consequently, there is 
no clear evidence that bettors simply anchor on their pre-conceived view of BP advantage 
discerned from the configuration of the racetrack or from the results of previous races. 
 
 Anchoring on the Results of the Previous Race Meeting 
     The  race  meetings  in  Hong  Kong  often  alternate  between  HV  and  ST  and  the  results 
displayed in Table 1 suggest that low BP affords a greater advantage to horses running at HV 
(c.f. ST). Consequently, the results displayed in Table 2 and discussed above may point to 
anchoring by bettors on the results from the previous race meeting held at the other venue 
earlier in the week (in support of hypothesis two). Laboratory experiments have demonstrated 
that subjects‟ judgments can be influenced by anchors encountered up to seven days earlier 
(Mussweiler, 2001). Therefore, it is entirely feasible that bettors‟ judgments are influenced by 
anchors formed by race outcomes observed at a race meeting held three or four days earlier.  
If bettors at HV/ST anchor their probability judgments on the results of races run earlier in 
the week at ST/HV, they are likely to under/over-estimate the value of a low BP. The results 
displayed in Tables 1 and 2 confirm the over- and under-betting of low BP horses in the 
manner predicted by hypothesis two.   
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In addition, a comparison of the degree of under/over betting of low BP at HV/ST for same 
track meetings (i.e. HV/ST meetings following HV/ST meetings) with that for different track 
meetings (i.e. HV meetings following ST meetings, and vice-versa) also supports hypothesis 
two (see Table 3). In particular, at both HV and ST, the coefficients of BP in CL models 
(simply incorporating BP) developed for same track meetings are negative and significant at 
the  5%  and  10%  levels,  respectively.  In  equivalent  CL  models  for  same  track  meetings, 
incorporating bettors‟ subjective probabilities, the BP coefficient is not significantly different 
to zero at HV or at ST, suggesting that bettors appropriately account for BP advantage. At 
different track meetings the coefficient of BP in CL models (simply incorporating BP) is 
negative and significant at the 1% level at HV, but is not significantly different to zero at ST. 
In  CL  models  incorporating  bettors‟  subjective  probabilities  and  BP  for  different  track 
meetings the BP coefficient is negative and significant at the 10% level at HV and is positive 
and significant at ST. These results imply that bettors over-estimate the advantage of low BP 
at ST and underestimate it at HV at different track meetings. Consequently, taken together, 
these  results  offer  strong  support  for  hypothesis  two.  In  particular,  there  appears  to  be 
anchoring on the results from the previous race meeting for the different track meetings; BP 
being under-bet at HV following a ST meeting and over-bet at ST following a HV meeting. 
However, in races at HV and ST which follow a previous meeting at the same track, BP is 
correctly accounted for in bettors‟ subjective probabilities. It appears that bettors are able to 
learn  to  appropriately  account  for  BP  at  a  particular  track,  provided  this  learning  is  not 
disrupted by an intervening race meeting at the alternative venue, where a different BP bias 
prevails. In the latter case, bettors appear to anchor on the results from the previous meeting, 
even when these are not relevant to races at the current track. 
 Further evidence to test hypothesis two is presented in Tables 4 and 5. The results of 
estimating CL models (incorporating BP) for the first three and last three races at HV and ST 
are  reported  in  Table  4.  At  HV  the  BP  variable  has  a  coefficient  which  is  negative  and 
significant in both sets of races, but the level of significance is greater in the last three races 
than in the first three races; suggesting that a low BP offers more advantage in the later races. 
This may arise because the race types and distances of races can vary between early and late 
races, and these factors may  influence BP advantage. In  addition,  the inside  rail is  often 
moved for later races, allowing horses drawn on the inside to run on fresh ground which has 
not been damaged by previous runners. The precise manner in which these factors combine to 
influence the effect of BP on race results is not clear, but the key issue in respect of the 
current research is that at HV the advantage of a low BP increases in later races.   
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Insert Tables 3, 4 and 5 about here 
 
At ST the coefficient on BP is again negative for both early and late races; significant at the 
10 % level in early races but insignificant in later races. This suggests that low BP confers 
some advantage in the first three races but no advantage in the later races. The differences in 
levels of significance of the BP variable between the models developed for HV and ST also 
demonstrate the greater advantage afforded to horses with a low BP at HV.  
    As indicated above, many factors could contribute to the BP advantage changing between 
the early and late races (e.g. race types, distance, prize money etc).  However, the reasons for 
this are not the central focus of this enquiry. Rather, we are concerned with the extent to 
which bettors anchor on BP, whatever level of advantage it confers at different times of the 
betting day. Consequently, when exploring to what extent BP is accounted for in odds, we do 
not control for different factors which could cause changes in the BP advantage throughout 
the betting day.  
    Table  5  reports the  results  of  estimating  CL  models  incorporating  the  BP  and  bettors‟ 
subjective probabilities in the first three and the last three races run at both HV and ST. Once 
again, we first explore the results associated with the odds which represent the combined 
probability judgments of all the market participants; that is, the final odds. As expected, at 
both HV and ST the coefficients of the natural log of the bettors‟ subjective probability are 
significant at the 1% level, suggesting that the probability judgments of bettors are highly 
correlated with actual winning probabilities. In the first three races at HV the BP coefficient is 
negative and significant at the 5% level. This suggests that, as the coefficient in the model 
incorporating only BP is also negative for the first three races at HV, bettors fail to take full 
account of the advantage of low BP in the early races. On the other hand, bettors at ST fully 
incorporate the low BP advantage in their subjective probability estimates in the first three 
races (the BP coefficient is not significant at the 5% level in the model combining bettors‟ 
subjective probability and BP).  
A different picture emerges in relation to the last three races at both tracks. At HV, low BP 
advantage increases substantially in later races, and bettors fully account for this in their 
probability judgments (the BP coefficient in the model incorporating bettors‟ probabilities is 
not significant at the 5 % level). However, at ST, where low BP advantage is significantly 
lower  in  the  last  three  races,  the  BP  coefficient  (in  a  CL  model  incorporating  bettors‟ 
subjective probabilities) is positive and significant at the 5% level; suggesting that bettors 
over-estimate low BP advantage when forming their probability judgments.   
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Taken  together,  the  results  relating  to  the  manner  in  which  bettors  account  for  BP 
advantage in the early and late races offer some support for hypothesis two: In particular, 
bettors in the first three races at HV significantly under-estimate the low BP advantage when 
assessing their subjective probabilities; suggesting that they may be anchored on the results of 
previous races run at ST. However, by the end of the HV race meeting (there are typically ten 
races at ST and eight at HV) they have fully adjusted their subjective probability estimates to 
account for the clear advantage enjoyed by horses with low BPs. Similar results are obtained 
when separating races run at HV immediately following a race meeting at ST. In particular, 
for  the  first  three  races,  the  BP  coefficient  in  a  CL  model  also  incorporating  bettors‟ 
subjective probabilities is significant at the 5% level (-0.0307, SE = 0.0143, N = 1301) but is 
not significantly different to zero in the last three races (-0.0095, SE = 0.0176). Consequently, 
bettors at HV appropriately account for BP in these later races, but they probably do not 
achieve this by simply relying on information from the first few race results at HV, since the 
advantage of low BP is much greater in the last three races. It is possible that a combination 
of re-familiarization with the racetrack configuration (having observed earlier races, the tight 
angle of the bends may once again influence their decision-making), previous results, and 
adjustment  of  their  mental  model  to  include  consideration  of  the  effect  of  different  race 
types/distances on the BP advantage, may all play a part in the bettors‟ learning process. The 
ability of bettors to develop such sophisticated mental models is confirmed by Ceci and Liker 
(1986).  
The  influence  of  anchoring  from  the  previous  race  meeting  is  further  confirmed  when 
examining same track meetings at HV separately. In this case BP advantage in the first three 
races at the meeting is fully accounted for in bettors‟ subjective probability judgments; the BP 
coefficient  in  a  CL  model  also  incorporating  bettors‟  subjective  probabilities  not  being 
significantly different to zero (-0.0538, SE = 0.0461, N = 127). This result is in contrast to that 
indicated above for races run at HV following a meeting at ST, where low BP advantage was 
not  fully  accounted  for in  bettors‟ subjective probabilities. These  results together  provide 
strong evidence of anchoring on experience from the previous race meeting at ST. 
Further support for hypothesis two is provided by an analysis of early and late races at ST. 
In later races where the actual advantage of a low BP decreases (and becomes insignificant) 
bettors‟ judgments over-estimate the advantage of a low BP (see Table 5). It may be that 
bettors anchor on the results of races run earlier that afternoon at ST. In addition, the lack of 
low BP advantage displayed in the results of later races at ST may well act as a considerable 
anchor  on  the  judgments  of  bettors  in  the  subsequent  early  races  at  HV;  and  the  results  
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reported  above  support  this  view.  However,  the  analysis  of  early  races  at  ST  offers  a 
challenge to hypothesis two: in the first three races of a ST meeting, where low BP confers a 
moderate  advantage,  bettors  fully  account  for  this  in  their  betting  decisions.  However, 
because the advantage of a low BP at ST in these early races is considerably lower than that 
experienced in the last three races at HV, hypothesis two would predict that ST bettors would 
anchor on the later results at HV and, consequently, would over-estimate the benefit of a low 
BP at ST. Separating races run at same and different track meetings does not shed additional 
light on the reasons for bettors at ST correctly accounting for BP advantage in the first three 
races. No BP advantage is discerned in the first three races at ST in either same or different 
track  meetings;  the  BP  coefficients  in  CL  models  simply  incorporating  BP  are  not 
significantly different to zero (same track meetings: -0.0150, SE= 0.0133, N = 1176; different 
track meetings: -0.0163, SE= 0.0117, N = 1642). Bettors at both same and different track 
meetings appear to be aware of this lack of BP advantage, since the coefficients of BP in CL 
models incorporating BP and bettors‟ subjective probability judgments are not significantly 
different to zero (same track meetings: 0.0113, SE = 0.0140; different track meetings: 0.0063, 
SE= 0.0125). 
Taken together, the results relating to the manner in which bettors at ST and HV account 
for BP bias in early and late races offer some support for the view that bettors anchor their 
probability judgments on race results they encounter at the previous race meeting. However, 
the simple relationship suggested by hypothesis two is not confirmed. There may, for example, 
be  complicated  inter-relationships  between  the  anchoring  based  on  the  previous  race 
meeting‟s results and the impact which racetrack configuration has on bettors‟ probability 
judgments: ST has a large circumference with relatively gentle bends and this may cause 
bettors to considerably reduce their estimates of low BP advantage (formed by anchoring on 
the outcomes of races at the previous HV meeting).  However, the results demonstrate that 
bettors at HV, when observing the track‟s tighter bends and smaller circumference, do not 
sufficiently increase their probability estimates of low BP advantage (formed by anchoring on 
the outcomes of races at the previous ST meeting) 
It  may  well  be  that  the  anchoring  effect  of  previous  race  outcomes  interacts  in  a 
complicated manner with anchoring effects caused by racetrack configuration. Whilst this is 
difficult to confirm, we aim to further our understanding of the extent to which bettors anchor 
on  previous  race  outcomes  by  testing  hypothesis  three,  namely,  that  bettors  anchor  their 




Anchoring on the Outcome of the Previous Race  
     Due  to  a  variety  of  factors  (e.g.,  certain  weather  conditions,  watering  regimes),  the 
advantage of certain BPs can alter throughout a racing day. One way in which bettors can 
discern such changes is to observe the result of the preceding race. Table 6 summarizes the 
BP advantage at both ST and HV in a subsequent race when the previous race was won by a 
horse with a (a) low BP (1-4) and (b) a high BP (>7). At both racetracks, when the previous 
race was won by a low BP horse, the BP coefficients in the CL models are negative and 
significant at the 1% level. In addition, at both racetracks these coefficients are more negative 
and more significant than those for CL models based on all races at these meetings (see Table 
1). Following a winner from a high BP, the coefficient of BP remains negative but is of 
reduced significance at HV, and at ST it is no longer significant at any conventional level. In 
this case these coefficients are both less negative and less significant than for those for CL 
models  based  on  all  races  at  these  meetings  (see  Table  1).  Taken  together,  these  results 
suggest  that  the  chance  of  a  horse  with  a  low  BP  winning  is  increased/decreased  if  the 
previous race was won by a horse from a low/high BP, although none of the changes in the 
BP coefficients are significant at the 5% level (i.e. following low BP win: HV, t=0.37; ST, t= 
1.69; following high BP win: HV, t= 1.14; ST, t=1.32). Our main concern is to examine to 
what  extent  bettors  base  their  probability  judgments  on  the  BP  advantage  information 
contained in the most recent race outcome. Consequently, we estimate separate CL models for 
HV and ST, incorporating odds probabilities and BP for races where the previous race was 
won by a horse from (a) low and (b) high BPs. The results are displayed in Table 7, and again 
we  focus  on  the  results  associated  with  the  final  odds,  which  represent  the  combined 
probability judgments of all the market participants.  
When the previous race was won by a horse from a low BP, the BP coefficients are not 
significant at any conventional level in models developed for ST and HV which incorporate 
both BP and odds implied probabilities. These results suggest that bettors at both tracks fully 
account for BP advantage in race following a low BP winner. In addition, when the previous 
race  was  won  by  a  horse  with  a  high  BP,  the  BP  coefficients  are  not  significant  at  any 
conventional level in the model developed for HV which incorporates both BP and odds 
implied probabilities. However, in equivalent models developed for ST, the BP coefficient is 
positive and significant at the 5% level. These results imply that bettors at HV fully account 
for BP advantage in the race following a high BP winner, whereas bettors at ST over-estimate 
the BP advantage.  




    Bettors  at  HV  generally  underestimate  the  advantage  of  a  low  BP  (see  Table  2). 
However, following a low-BP winner they fully account for low BP advantage in the next 
race.  This  suggests  that  bettors  use  previous  race  outcome  information  to  improve  their 
calibration. The analysis also demonstrates that the low BP advantage at HV is reduced in a 
race following a high BP winner (see Table 6). There are potentially two reasons for bettors 
correctly accounting for BP advantage in this subsequent race. It may be that bettors use the 
previous  race  outcome  information  appropriately  when  forming  probability  estimates  or, 
given that bettors at HV generally under-estimate the advantage of low BPs, the reduction in 
the winning chances of a horse from a low BP may be all that is needed to bring bettors‟ 
views  into  line  with  reality.  In  other  words,  the  results  are  also  consistent  with  bettors 
ignoring the previous race result (when a high BP horse wins) because it does not accord with 
their mental model of the likely BP advantage. Previous research suggests that individuals 
discount evidence which runs counter to existing perceptions; the inconsistent evidence may 
be  discounted  deliberately  to  reduce  dissonance  and  effort  (Harries  et  al.,  2004).  Bettors 
certainly  do  not  appear  to  unduly  anchor  on  a  high  BP  victory  (a  low  probability  event 
according to their mental model) in the previous race. A somewhat similar effect has been 
found in a laboratory gambling task (Carlson, 1990).      
At ST, the chance of a horse with a low BP winning when the previous race was won from 
a low BP, significantly increases (the BP coefficient being significant at the 1% level (see 
Table 6), whereas it is only significant at the  5% level where no information on the previous 
winner is available (see Table 1). Bettors at ST generally over-estimate the value of a low BP 
(see Table 2). However, following a winner from a low BP they correctly account for the 
enhanced low BP advantage in the next race. Whether this arises from appropriate use of 
information contained in the result of the previous race, or simply because the advantage of a 
low BP is now more in line with bettors pre-conceived view of this advantage, can not be 
determined.  
    At ST, horses with a low BP have an advantage (see Table 1). However, when a horse from 
a high BP wins a race the low BP advantage in the subsequent race becomes insignificant (see 
Table 6). Bettors do not appear to fully account for the information contained in a high BP 
victory, since the results show that they continue to over-estimate the advantage of a low BP 
in the subsequent race (see Table 7). It is again possible that they discount the high BP winner 
since it is a low probability event according to their mental model of BP advantage (Carlson, 
1990).   
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Taken together, the results of exploring the degree to which bettors account for changes in 
the BP advantage which can be discerned from the outcome of the previous race, do not 
provide support for hypothesis three. When a race result accords with the bettors‟ mental 
model  of  BP  advantage  (determined,  for  example,  from  racetrack  configuration)  there  is 
evidence that bettors may use this information appropriately (e.g. bettors at HV appear to use 
a low BP victory to correctly increase their assessment of the chances of a low BP victory in 
the  subsequent  race).  This  result  is  in  accord  with  the  notion  of  “recency”,  whereby 
individual‟s judgments tend to hinge more on the most recent evidence in a sequence of 
evolving information (e.g., Ashton & Kennedy, 2002; Krull et al., 1993). However, some of 
the evidence presented above suggests that bettors may fail to take full account of previous 
race outcomes which fall outside their mental model of BP advantage; this result is in line 
with some previous research (e.g. Harries et al., 2004). Consequently, it is suggested that the 
manner in which bettors use information, and hence their degree of anchoring, may depend 
upon a complex relationship between the strength of their existing mental model, the degree 
to which the potential anchor accords with this mental model, and the nature of the anchor 
information. 
 
Expertise and Anchoring 
    Finally, we turn to testing hypothesis four, which is based on previous laboratory findings 
that decision makers with greater expertise are less prone to anchoring effects (e.g., Northcraft 
& Neale, 1987; Shelton, 1999). In particular, we examine whether the degree of anchoring 
observed when testing hypotheses one to three, is related to bettors‟ expertise.  
It was suggested above, that the observed under/over-valuation of low BP advantage at 
HV/ST, could have been caused by bettors anchoring on the results of races run at the other 
racetrack earlier in the week. These effects are considerably more pronounced when the bets 
of those considered as having less expertise are examined. For example, the BP coefficients in 
the  CL  models  incorporating  odds  and  estimated  using  HV  data  are  considerably  more 
significant for models based on early odds and late odds than in models based on final odds 
(see Table 2). A similar pattern is observed for the CL models based on ST data (see Table 2). 
These results are confirmed when races are separated into same and different track meetings. 
For  example,  at  HV,  for  different  track  meetings,  the  BP  coefficient  in  a  CL  also 
incorporating bettors‟ subjective probabilities, is significant at the 1% level when the model is 
based on early odds (-0.0362, SE = 0.0087, N = 1301) but is not significant at the 5% level 
when  based  on  final  odds  (-0.0151,  SE=  0.0089).  At  same  track  meetings  the  difference  
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between models based on early and final odds is less pronounced (as might be expected, since 
less  bias  is  introduced  by  anchoring  on  an  inappropriate  BP  advantage  observed  at  the 
alternative venue). However, final odds still appear to correctly account for BP to a greater 
extent. For example, in CL models incorporating bettors‟ subjective probabilities and BP, 
developed for same track meetings at ST, the coefficient on BP is significant at the 10% level 
when the model is based on early odds but is not significant at any conventional level when 
the model is based on final odds (early odds: 0.0132, SE = 0.0080; final odds: 0.0108, SE = 
0.0080). 
Taken together, these results suggest that those with less expertise are more likely to anchor 
their  judgments  on  race  outcomes  from  the  previous  race  meeting.  In  practice  this 
phenomenon is more pronounced than is demonstrated by the results displayed in Table 2. 
This arises because the odds are determined by the relative amounts of money on each horse 
(see  Eq.  1).  Consequently  the  final  odds,  which  we  have  associated  with  those  with  the 
greatest expertise, will be determined by the money wagered by these individuals and by the 
earlier bets of those with less expertise. 
Examination of the degree to which BP advantage is accounted for in odds in early and late 
races at HV and ST suggests that those with less expertise are more likely to anchor on the 
results  at  the  previous  race  meeting.  In  particular,  it  was  postulated  that  bettors  at  HV, 
particularly in the first three races, anchor their judgments on the bettors‟ experience earlier 
that week at ST (where low BP offers less advantage). It is clear from the results for the first 
three races at HV, displayed in Table 5, that the BP coefficients, in CL models incorporating 
BP and bettors‟ subjective probabilities, are negative for bets at early, late and final odds. 
These coefficients are increasingly significant for models based on odds formed by bettors 
with less expertise; suggesting that less experienced bettors under-value the advantage of low 
BP to a greater extent than those with more expertise. These results are confirmed when 
specifically exploring different track meetings. For example, in the first three races at HV the 
BP coefficient is negative and significant at the .01% when the model is based on early odds 
(-0.0518, SE = 0.0141, N = 1301), but is only significant at the 5% level when based on late 
odds (-0.0307, SE = 0.0143). Consequently, bettors with less expertise appear more prone to 
anchor on the results from the race meeting at ST held prior to the HV meeting. For HV races 
at same track meetings a less pronounced difference is observed between models based on 
early and late odds (as might be expected, since less bias is introduced by anchoring on an 
inappropriate BP advantage observed at the previous ST meeting); the BP coefficients for the  
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first three races are not significant at the 5% level in either case, although the significance of 
the BP coefficient is greater in the model based on early odds (early odds:      
-0.0586, SE = 0.0461; late odds: -0.0538, SE = 0.0461, N=127). 
None of the coefficients for BP in the CL models estimated on the three sets of odds (final, 
late and early odds) for the first three races at ST are significant (see Table 5; this result also 
holds for models based on both same and different track meetings), although they are all 
positive and the Z value is greatest for the model based on odds formed by bettors with least 
expertise. These results provide weak evidence in favor of more anchoring on the results from 
the previous HV meeting by those bettors with less expertise.  
In the CL models estimated for the last three races at ST, based on final and late odds (early 
odds are not included in the comparison since these were formed by individuals without the 
benefit of observing the earlier races at ST), the BP coefficients are positive and significant 
(see Table 5). This suggests that, despite the reduced advantage of low BP in these late races, 
bettors continue to anchor on the results from earlier in the day when low BP had a more 
distinct  advantage.  However,  the  degree  of  anchoring  on  earlier  results  is  slightly  less 
pronounced for those bettors with greater expertise. Neither of the coefficients for BP in CL 
models for the last three races at HV, estimated on the late and final odds, is significant, 
although their relative size provides some weak evidence that bettors with greater expertise 
use information from earlier results more appropriately to adjust their probability estimates in 
later races. 
Taken together, the results discussed above suggest that bettors with greater expertise are 
less prone to anchoring effects. As indicated in section IV, our method for distinguishing the 
bets of those with different levels of expertise somewhat understates the degree to which they 
differ. Consequently, our results point strongly to expertise reducing the degree to which 
anchoring is employed. This finding is this is in line with the results of experimental studies. 
For  example,  Shelton  (1999)  found  that  more-experienced  auditors  (audit  managers  and 
partners) were less influenced by irrelevant information encountered during audit judgments 
than auditors with less experience (audit seniors). Similarly, Northcraft and Neale (1987) 
demonstrated that naive subjects (undergraduate business school students) were more prone to 
anchor their estimates of a house‟s value on less relevant information than expert subjects 
(real estate agents). 
The final set of results exploring the relationship between expertise and anchoring do not 
accord with conclusions reached in previous research: A comparison of CL models based on 
final and late odds, estimated for races run at HV and ST, reveal no appreciable differences in  
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the manner which the immediately preceding race outcomes are used by bettors with varying 
levels of expertise (see Tables 6 and 7). It appears that bettors with varying levels of expertise 
are  able  to  appropriately  employ  information  contained  in  the  most  recent  race  result. 
However, as indicated above, those bettors with less expertise are more prone to anchoring on 
an earlier series of race outcomes.  
    Overall, the results suggest that experts are less prone to anchoring. However, it could be 
argued that to some extent it is surprising that the experts in the Hong Kong market are 
subject to any anchoring at all. It has been widely reported (e.g. Benter, 1994) that large 
betting syndicates, using sophisticated computer models operate in the Hong Kong market. 
They are attracted to these markets due to the high betting volumes, which provide them with 
the opportunity to recoup the significant set up and operating costs of such operations. In 
addition, the strict regulation of these markets by the Hong Kong Jockey Club (which helps to 
eliminate  mal-practice  and  insider  trading,  which  would  be  difficult  for  their  models  to 
incorporate) and their openness with regard to information about prior results, provides the 
ideal  conditions  for  the  construction  of  „rational‟  models.  These  are  designed  to 
systematically account for factors likely to influence the probability of a horse winning. The 
syndicates will then bet on horses where the public‟s assessments (as evidenced by the market 
odds close to the start of the race) under-estimate a horse‟s chance of winning, as predicted by 
their model. Anecdotal evidence suggests that these syndicates make substantial profits and 
there is evidence that their betting activities may eliminate some biases which are observed in 
markets where these syndicates do not operate (e.g. the favorite-longshot bias: Busche & Hall, 
1988; Busche, 1994). However, whilst these syndicates may employ computer models and be 
successful, the models are developed by human beings and there is no evidence that they bet 
optimally. In fact, whilst their bets do reduce the degree of anchoring displayed in the odds in 
this  market,  some  anchoring  remains,  suggesting  that  even  highly  sophisticated  experts 





A number of conclusions emerge from the research: First, that caution must be exercised 
when examining anchoring effects in a real world environment, since mis-specification of the 
problem  can  easily  occur  by  combining  data  inappropriately.  In  the  current  study,  no 
anchoring  was  observed  when  data  for  the  Hong  Kong  betting  market  as  a  whole  was 
analyzed. However, this false conclusion arose because bettors, when making their probability  
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judgments, under-valued the advantage of a low BP at one track and over-valued it at another. 
It is suggested, and demonstrated, that both of these behaviors arise through anchoring and yet 
their effects were masked when examining the market as a whole.  
Second, the paper demonstrates that anchoring in real world environments is a complex 
phenomenon. Bettors do not, for example, simply anchor on the configuration of a racetrack 
or  on  media  analysis  which  suggests  that  particular  BPs  will  have an  advantage.  Rather, 
bettors appear subject to complex anchoring effects. In particular, the research suggests that 
bettors can anchor on a series of race outcomes from a race meeting held earlier that week. 
However, this behavior appears to be moderated by other factors, such as the current racetrack 
configuration and their own mental model of BP advantage. In fact, bettors do not anchor on 
the result of the most recent race or series of races run on the same day when they are forming 
probability judgments. On the contrary,  they appear to  appropriately  use  this  information 
when forming their probability judgments later that day, particularly, when the previous race 
outcomes  are  in  line  with  their  mental  model  of  BP  advantage.  However,  there  is  some 
evidence that when race outcomes are contrary to their mental model, bettors fail to take full 
account  of  the  information.  For  example,  following  a  high  BP  victory,  bettors  do  not 
sufficiently adjust their subjective probability estimates of a horse with a low BP winning the 
next race. In summary, the results suggest that anchoring effects in the horse race betting 
market are subtle and are influenced by a range of factors, including racetrack configuration 
and previous race outcomes; these factors appear to interact to produce a complex anchoring 
phenomenon.  
Third, the results suggest that basic anchoring effects in a real world environment can be 
robust and relatively long lived. This result is in sharp contrast to previous studies conducted 
in  the  laboratory,  which  suggest  that  because  basic  anchoring  does  not  involve  a  direct 
comparison process between anchors and targets, basic anchoring effects are fragile and can 
easily disappear (e.g. Brewer and Chapman, 2002). Further work is needed to explore the 
nature of the factors experienced in a real world environment which appear to increase the 
impact of basic anchoring effects.  
Fourth,  the  results  suggest  that,  in  general,  decision  makers  with  greater  expertise  use 
information more appropriately and are less prone to anchoring effects. However, whilst this 
is true for anchoring based on a recent series of previous races, either at the current, or at 
another racetrack, no differences were detected between those with greater and less expertise 
in terms of the degree to which they anchor on the results of the last race encountered. This, 
to some extent, accords with expectations in betting markets, since expert bettors are widely  
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regarded as being distinguished from those with less expertise by the considerable resources 
they spend in overcoming the complexity of analyzing (and developing probability estimates 
based on) the outcomes of previous series of races (Benter, 1994).  
    In summary, the paper presents evidence of subtle, complex anchoring effects in a real 
world environment. Most previous anchoring studies have been conducted in the laboratory 
on individuals. An important feature of the current study is that it examines behavior in a 
financial market. In many ways one might expect markets to eliminate individual anchoring 
effects, as some individuals seek to exploit the biases of others. The odds, reflecting the 
betting  behaviors  of  those  subject  to  the  biases  and  the  behaviors  of  those  who  seek  to 
capitalize  on  the  biases,  should,  in  theory,  be  driven  to  a  point  where  no  bias  exists. 
Remarkably, we find that these markets still exhibit the effects of anchoring. Clearly, the 
anchoring effects we observe are complex and it is possible that the behavior of individuals in 
a betting market, who are faced by a negative expected return, may be different to that of 
individuals facing other situations involving risk. In addition, race specific factors (e.g. race 
distance, race quality etc. ) may influence the extent to which bettors anchor their judgments 
Equally, institutional factors associated with the Hong Kong horserace betting market which 
are discussed above (e.g. large betting syndicates, openness of information, strict regulation) 
may  have  an  impact  on  the  degree  of  anchoring  which  we  detect.  Consequently,  more 
research is needed to identify the factors which influence the degree and nature of anchoring 




1. All odds in HK are rounded to the nearest (lower) 10 cents. Consequently, by knowing this 
and the level of deductions d, we can use Equation (1) to work back from the final odds to 
provide an estimate of 
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a based on races run at: 
HV  ST  HV+ST 
ij BP coef. 
b  -.0782**  -.0107*  -.0299** 
SE  .0078  .0048  .0041 
Z  -10.03  -2.20  -7.27 
LL  -3488.90  -7272.80  -10789.00 
Model LR (
2
1  )  102.81**  4.82*  53.00** 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0145  0.0003  0.0025 
No. of horses  16971  37364  54335 
No. of races  1428  2818  4246 
 




ij BP a BP a p
1 1 1 ) exp( ) exp(    
b  ij BP : the BP of horse i in race j 
HV: Happy Valley racetrack in Hong Kong 
ST: Sha Tin racetrack in Hong Kong 
HV+ST: Combination of all races run at HV and ST racetracks 
** Significant at the 1% level 




Table 2: Results of Estimating CL Models with the Horse’s BP and Bettors’ Subjective Probability Judgments as Independent Variables 
 
Models
a based on subjective judgments derived from: 
Final odds  Odds 5 minutes before race starts  Overnight odds 
HV  ST  HV+ST  HV  ST  HV+ST  HV  ST  HV+ST 
s
ij p ln coef. 
b  .9514**  1.0282**  1.0112**  .9297**  1.0175**  .9983**  .9574**  1.0533**  1.0325** 
SE  .0369  .0227  .0193  .0373  .0230  .0195  0.4000  .0242  .0207 
Z  25.77  45.27  52.49  24.95  44.32  51.26  23.95  43.47  49.95 
ij BP coef. 
c 
-.0141
+  .0136**  .0065  -.0216*  .0133*  .0042  -.0342**  .0153**  .0016 
SE  .0085  .0052  .0044  .0084  .0052  .0044  .0083  .0052  .0043 
Z  -1.66  2.62  1.47  -2.56  2.58  0.96  -4.14  2.97  0.38 
LL  -3093.9  -5983.9  -9082.4  -3126.0  -6065.7  -9198.7  -3177.7  -6204.3  -9395.6 
Model LR (
2
2  )  892.8**  2582.6**  3466.3**  828.7**  2419.0**  3233.5**  725.2**  2141.8**  2839.8** 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1261  0.1775  0.1602  0.1170  0.1662  0.1495  0.1024  0.1472  0.1313 
No. of horses  16971  37364  54335  16971  37364  54335  16971  37364  54335 
No. of races  1428  2818  4246  1428  2818  4246  1428  2818  4246 








ij p b BP a p b BP a p
1 1 2 1 2 ) ln ( ) ln exp(
 
b s
ij p ln : natural log of the odds implied probability of horse i winning race j; 
 
c  ij BP : the BP of horse i in race j 
HV: Happy Valley racetrack in Hong Kong; ST: Sha Tin racetrack in Hong Kong; HV+ST: Combination of all races run at HV and ST racetracks; 
 ** Significant at the 1% level; * Significant at the 5% level; 
+ Significant at the 10% level 
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Table  3:  Results  of  Estimating  CL  Models  with  (a)Horse’s  BP  and  (b)  Horse’s  BP  and 
Bettors’ Subjective Probability Judgments as Independent Variables for Same and Different 
Track Meetings 
 




  HV  ST  HV  ST 
ij BP coef. 
a  -.0527*  -.0127
+  -.0808**  -.0093 
SE  .0257  .0075  .0082  .0064 
Z  -2.05  -1.68  -9.86  -1.46 
LL  -312.9  -3032.3  -3175.5  -4240.3 
Model LR (
2
1  )  4.26*  2.83
+  99.64**  2.12 
Pseudo-R
2  .0068  .0005  .0154  .0003 




ij BP a BP a p
1 1 1 ) exp( ) exp(   
 
  HV  ST  HV  ST 
s
ij p ln coef. 
b  .8105**  1.004**  .9666**  1.0451** 
SE  .1158  .0352  .0390  .0297 
Z  7.00  28.50  24.81  35.16 
ij BP coef. 
  -.0035  .0108  -.0151
+  .0156* 
SE  .0278  .0080  .0089  .0068 
Z  -.13  1.35  -1.70  2.29 
LL  -284.5  -2528.5  -2808.4  -3454.9 
Model LR (
2
1  )  61.0**  1010.4*  893.9**  1573.0** 
Pseudo-R
2  .0969  .1665  .1293  .1854 
No. of horses  1521  15586  15450  21778 
No. of races  127  1176  1301  1642 








ij p b BP a p b BP a p
1 1 2 1 2 ) ln ( ) ln exp(  
a  ij BP : the BP of horse i in race j 
b 
s
ij p ln : natural log of the odds implied probability of horse i winning race j 
HV: Happy Valley racetrack in Hong Kong;  ST: Sha Tin racetrack in Hong Kong 
** Significant at the 1% level; * Significant at the 5% level; 
+ Significant at the 10% level  
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Table 4: Results of Estimating CL Models for the First and Last Three Races with the Horse’s 




a based on races run at: 
HV  ST 
 
First 3 races 
ij BP coef. 
b  -.0970**  -.0157
+ 
SE  .0130  .0088 
Z  -7.51  -1.79 
 
Last 3 races 
ij BP coef. 
b  -.6570**  -.0038 
SE  .1570  .0079 
Z  -4.19  -0.48 
Overall model statistics:  
LL  -3502.2  -7273.5 
Model LR 
2
2    76.2**  3.43 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0108  0.0002 
No. of horses  16971  37364 
No. of races  1428  2818 
 




ij BP a BP a p
1 1 1 ) exp( ) exp(    
b  ij BP : the BP of horse i in race j 
HV: Happy Valley racetrack in Hong Kong 
ST: Sha Tin racetrack in Hong Kong 













Table 5: Results of Estimating CL Models for the First and Last Three Races with the Horse’s 




a based on subjective judgments derived from: 
Final odds 
Odds 5 minutes before 
race starts 
Overnight odds 
HV  ST  HV  ST  HV  ST 
s
ij p ln coef. 
b  .9517**  1.0261**  .9338**  1.0155**  .9674**  1.0502** 
SE  .0363  .0227  .0367  .0229  .0396  .0242 
Z  26.20  45.28  25.43  44.32  24.44  43.48 
First 3 
races 
ij BP coef. 
c 
-.0330*  .0086  -.0421**  .0078  -.0524**  .0096 
SE  .0137  .0094  .0137  .0093  .0135  .0093 
Z  -2.41  0.91  -3.08  0.84  -3.88  1.03 
Last 3 
races 
ij BP coef. 
c 
-.0073  .0174*  -.0125  .0178*  .0261  .0197* 
SE  .0167  .0085  .0167  .0085  .0164  .0084 
Z  -0.44  2.05  -0.75  2.10  -1.59  2.35 
Overall model statistics:  
LL  -3092.3  -5984.8  -3124.2  -6066.5  -3177.5  -6205.4 
Model LR (
2
2  )  896.1**  2580.8**  832.2**  2417.4**  725.7**  2139.5** 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1265  0.1774  0.1175  0.1661  0.1025  0.1470 
No. of horses  16971  37364  16971  37364  16971  37364 
No. of races  1428  2818  1428  2818  1428  2818 








ij p b BP a p b BP a p




ij p ln : natural log of the odds implied probability of horse i winning race j 
c  ij BP : the BP of horse i in race j 
HV: Happy Valley racetrack in Hong Kong 
ST: Sha Tin racetrack in Hong Kong 
** Significant at the 1% level 






Table 6: Results of Estimating CL Models for Races Where Previous Race won by Horse with 
Low/High BP, with the Horse’s BP as Independent Variable 
 
Previous race won by horse 
with BP 
Model
a  based on races run at: 






ij BP coef. 
b  -.0838**  -.0281** 
SE  .0130  .0092 
Z  -6.44  -3.06 
LL  -1262.7  -2039.5 
Model LR (
2
1  )  42.48**  9.41** 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0165  0.0023 
  No. of horses  6156  10548 






ij BP coef. 
b  -.0624**  -.0001 
SE  .0114  .0064 
Z  -5.47  -0.02 
LL  -1612.4  -4156.7 
Model LR (
2
1  )  30.4**  0.0000 
Pseudo-R
2  0.0093  0.0000 
  No. of horses  6575  18601 
  No. of races  552  1408 
 




ij BP a BP a p
1 1 1 ) exp( ) exp(    
b  ij BP : the BP of horse i in race j 
HV: Happy Valley racetrack in Hong Kong 
ST: Sha Tin racetrack in Hong Kong 







Table 7: Results of estimating CL models for races where previous race won by horse with 
low/high  BP,  with  the  BP  and  bettors’  subjective  probability  judgments  as  independent 
variables 
Previous race won by horse 
with BP: 
Models
a based on subjective judgments derived from: 
Final odds  Late odds 




ij p ln coef. 
b  1.0012**  .9849**  .9674**  .9724** 
SE  .0622  .0432  .0622  .0436 
Z  16.10  22.77  15.55  22.32 
ij BP coef. 
c 
-.0123  .0004  -.0200  -.0004 
SE  .0141  .0097  .0141  .0097 
Z  -0.87  0.04  -1.42  -0.04 
LL  -1106.4  -1721.0  -1120.6  -1740.8 
Model LR (
2
2  )  355.1**  646.3**  326.8**  606.9** 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1383  0.1581  0.1272  0.1484 
No. of horses  6156  10548  6156  10548 




ij p ln coef. 
b  .8969**  1.0418**  .8843**  1.0349** 
SE  .0538  .0299  .0548  .0303 
Z  16.68  34.89  16.14  34.15 
ij BP coef. 
c  -.0049  .0242**  -.0117  .0242** 
SE  .0123  .0068  .0123  .0067 
Z  -0.39  3.52  -0.96  3.53 
LL  -1449.1  -3381.4  -1461.8  -3430.1 
Model LR (
2
2  )  357.0**  1550.6**  -331.65**  1453.1** 
Pseudo-R
2  0.1097  0.1865  0.1019  0.1748 
No. of horses  6575  18601  6575  18601 
No. of races  552  1408  552  1408 








ij p b BP a p b BP a p




ij p ln : Natural log of the odds implied probability of horse i winning race j; 
c  ij BP : BP of horse i in race j 
HV: Happy Valley racetrack in Hong Kong; ST: Sha Tin racetrack in Hong Kong 
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